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This paper describes a symbolic model of
rational action and decision making to sup-
port analysing dialogue. The model ap-
proximates principles of behaviour from
game theory, and its proof theory makes
Gricean principles of cooperativity deriv-
able when the agents’ preferences align.
1 Introduction
Grice (1975) and Neo-Griceans model the
link between dialogue processing and general
principles of rational behaviour by assuming
that agents abide by a strong cooperativity
principle—namely, people normally believe what
they say and help other agents achieve the goals
that they reveal through their utterances. This
principle provides cooperativity on at least two
levels: a basic level that ensures coordination
on the conventions governing linguistic mean-
ing (basic cooperativity); and a level concerning
shared attitudes towards what is said, including
shared intentions (content cooperativity). But not
all conversations are content cooperative. For ex-
ample, Tomm and Dave don’t share intentions in
(1), taken from chat recordings of an online ver-
sion of the game Settlers of Catan where players
negotiate over restricted resources:
(1) a. Tomm: Got any clay to trade for
sheep/wheat?
b. Dave: Only got 1 and I’m holding on
to it, sorry.
However, even though Settlers is a win-lose
game where players’ interests are often opposed,
its players often do share intentions, as they must
cooperate to bargain for resources they need in
the game.
(2) a. William: can i get a sheep or a wheat?
b. i have too much wood.
c. Cat: i can give you a wheat.
d. William: good
[they exchange 1 wheat for 1 wood]
Conversely, dialogue (3) is content cooperative
(and basic cooperative) on the assumption that A
andB are constructing a plan to achieve the same
goal—that they both eat at Chop Chop:
(3) a. A: Let’s go to Chop Chop by car.
b. B: But there’s no parking.
c. A: Then let’s take the bus.
But (3b) implicates that B rejects the intention
underlying (3a)—to go to Chop Chop by car. The
grounds for the rejecting moves in (1) vs. (3)
are different. In (1) Dave can fulfil Tomm’s in-
tention but chooses not to, presumably because
of his conflicting preferences. In (3) A and B
(transiently) have different intentions because of
their conflicting beliefs about the optimal way to
achieve a shared preference: to eat at Chop Chop.
There have been several attempts to make
models of conversation that abide by Gricean
principles of cooperativity formally precise; for
instance, by expressing axioms in a logic that
supports defeasible reasoning about the cogni-
tive states of dialogue agents (e.g., Schulz (2007),
Asher and Lascarides (2003)). Such models
include (default) axioms Sincerity (following
Grice’s maxim of Quality (Grice, 1975, p46)): if
a cooperative agent says something then he nor-
mally believes it. They also include axioms at the
level of intentions. For instance, the following
default axiom of Strong Cooperativity is adapted
from Grice’s analysis of what an utterance means
in cooperative conversation (Grice, 1969, p151):
if an agent says something that implies he has a
particular intention φ that he also intends should
be recognised, then a cooperative agent should
normally adopt that intention φ too (e.g., (Grosz
and Sidner, 1990, p430), Asher (in press)). But
such formalisations are incomplete because they
do not handle cases like (1) where content co-
operativity breaks down: the default axioms just
given don’t apply in such contexts. Nor do they
predict when adopting shared intentions is opti-
mal in a strategic setting (e.g., (2)). Furthermore,
(3) shows that, rather than expressing content co-
operative behaviour in terms of the default adop-
tion of the other agents’ intentions, it would be
better to define it in terms of shared preferences;
that way, rejection is rational when conflicting
beliefs yield a different optimal way to achieve
a shared preference.
This paper provides a cognitive model within
which one can explore reasoning about the men-
tal states of dialogue agents. We will derive
Gricean principles of cooperativity, formalised as
defeasible principles, from a characterisation of
certain games, using game theory as the founda-
tion of strategic reasoning and also as the basis
for linking inferences about conversation to ra-
tional action. In game theory, agents act so as
to maximise their expected utility—utility being
a measure of preference, and the term expected
ensuring that decisions about action are made rel-
ative to one’s beliefs about what the outcomes of
the actions will be, including beliefs about what
other agents will do. Nevertheless, we argue in
Section 2 that game theory on its own provides
an incomplete picture, which makes it difficult to
use to derive defeasible principles. The symbolic
cognitive model presented in Section 3 addresses
this problem. It provides axioms approximating
rational behaviour from game theory that link di-
alogue actions and mental states, and its proof
theory allows us to derive Gricean principles of
cooperativity when the agents’ preferences align.
We relate this approach to prior work in Section 4
and point to future work in Section 5.
2 Our Model
Our model for strategic agents is one that is based
on logic and on game theory. Like many oth-
ers, we use a variant of a Belief Desire Inten-
tion (BDI) logic to formalise Gricean implica-
tures. But because we countenance misdirection
and deception as features of strategic conversa-
tion, we draw a distinction between Public and
Private attitudes and thus introduce a new atti-
tude for public commitment. Speaking makes an
agent publicly commit to some content (Hamblin,
1987). Traditional mentalist models of dialogue,
couched within BDI logics, equate dialogue in-
terpretation with updating mental states: e.g., in-
terpreting an assertion that p is equivalent to up-
dating one’s model of the speaker’s mental state
to include a belief in p (e.g., Grosz and Sidner
(1990)). But they are not equivalent in (4):
(4) a. Loreleil292: Can anyone give me some
clay for some wheat?
b. AMI123: Sorry have none of that!
[in fact, she has 2 clay]
We interpret (4b) as a negative answer even if
we know AMI121’s beliefs are inconsistent with
this. To do justice to this, we follow Asher and
Lascarides (2003) and separate the representation
and logic of dialogue content from that of cogni-
tive states and then link them via defeasible trans-
fer principles. This separation was originally mo-
tivated by calculable implicatures being unavail-
able as antecedents to surface anaphora; insincer-
ity provides a new motivation.
In common with game theoretic models of
conversation (e.g., Parikh (2001)), we adopt a
second principle: people say things that will
maximise their expected utility. So if the Gricean
maxims of conversation hold, they do so be-
cause they maximise the agents’ expected util-
ity. We also maintain that agents’ preferences
evolve as dialogue proceeds, at least partly be-
cause agents learn about other agents’ prefer-
ences from what they say and then adjust at least
some of their preferences in the light of this infor-
mation. People’s preferences are typically par-
tial and get more specific or evolve as they learn
more through conversation.
This last assumption poses a problem for or-
thodox game theory. Game theory assumes each
player has a completely defined preference func-
tion over the possible actions in the game. It
models uncertain and partial information that one
player has about another player’s preferences and
the actions that other play is contemplating per-
forming by a probability distribution over player
types, where each type is associated with a com-
plete set of actions and a complete utility func-
tion.1 Game theory, however, does not provide
general principles for restricting the set of player
types one needs to consider or the probability dis-
tributions over them. This gap has bite in mod-
elling conversation, because the possible signals
that grammars of natural languages allow are un-
bounded, as are the coherent signals in context.
So dialogue agents generally face the task of iso-
lating their game problem to a set of signals that
is small enough to effectively perform inference
over, but large enough to yield reliable decisions
about optimal actions.
To represent dialogue processing it would be
better not to remain silent on how one identi-
fies which player types—and hence which ac-
tions and preferences—are relevant, but rather
to consider a partial theory or description of the
agent’s preferences that is updated or revised as
one learns more about the agent or one consid-
ers actions that one didn’t consider before. This
is what we do here. This approach yields a
more compact and tractable cognitive model and
a proof theory in which we can reason, in the light
of new evidence, about what type of player to
consider in our reasoning. Standard game-theory
provides models that can verify the soundness of
our proof theoretic reasoning. Whether the sen-
tences in this theory are assigned probabilities is
not terribly relevant. But what is important is that
elements of this theory get revised in the light of
1Game theory allows players to have imperfect knowl-
edge of what action other players play, but that is not rele-
vant here.
new evidence, as Alchourro´n et al. (1985) sug-
gest. This can either be done by conditionalising
a probability distribution over new evidence, or
more symbolically via a theory that incorporates
general but defeasible principles about human ac-
tion and the preferences that underlie them.
In our symbolic model, instead of a probability
distribution over every possible complete model
of the game we begin with just one partial model.
We will describe this model in a way that meshes
easily with inferring preferences from observing
what agents do. We demonstrate one advantage
of this approach here: the proof theory afforded
by our symbolic axioms of rational behaviour,
which approximate those from game theory, is
sufficient to derive Gricean principles of coop-
erativity, among them the default axioms of Sin-
cerity and Strong Cooperativity that we discussed
in Section 1. We thus gain a logical link be-
tween strategic conversation and content cooper-
ative conversation.
3 Cognitive Modelling
To reason about an agent’s motives and actions
we use a familiar modal logic: Baφ means agent
a believes φ, and Iaφ means a intends to bring
about a state that entails φ. We assume that Ba
abides by the modal axioms KD45 (so its ac-
cessibility relation in the model is transitive, eu-
clidean and serial); so an agent’s beliefs are mu-
tually consistent with one another and closed un-
der logical consequence, and agents have total in-
trospection on their beliefs or lack thereof. We
make Ia abide by the modal axiom D (so its
accessibility relation in the model is serial), so
contradictory intentions are ruled out. We also
assume that intentions are doxastically transpar-
ent: i.e., Iaφ ↔ BaIaφ is an axiom. We also
need a modal operator for public commitment,
which is distinct from belief: Pa,Dφ means agent
a publicly commits to φ to the group of agents
D. Following Asher and Lascarides (2008), we
make Pa,D K45 (one commits to all the conse-
quences of one’s commitments and one has total
introspection on commitments or lack of them).
Unlike belief, commitments can be contradictory
because one can declare anything.
Reasoning about mental states is inherently de-
feasible, so we add to our logic the weak con-
ditional from Commonsense Entailment (Asher,
1995): A > B means If A then normally B.
We call this language CL (standing for cogni-
tive logic). This logic has many nice properties;
for instance, soundness completeness and decid-
ability (Asher, 1995). Decidability is maintained
even in a dynamic version of the CL (Asher and
Lascarides, 2011), but for the sake of simplicity
we will consider the static version here.
The dialogue’s logical form creates public
commitments in CL: if the logical form stipulates
that agent a is committed toK at turn n—soK is
the content of a clause or of coherently related di-
alogue segments—then this makes Pa,dK true in
CL, where K is the CL-representation of the for-
mula K in the separate logic of dialogue content,
and D is the set of dialogue agents (how K maps
to K is detailed in (Lascarides and Asher, 2009)
but doesn’t concern us here).2
3.1 Preferences
Besides a representation of dialogue content and
BDI attitudes, we need a symbolic way of rep-
resenting preferences and commitments to pref-
erences. CP-nets (Boutilier et al., 2004) provide
a useful formalism for extracting commitments
to preferences from utterances (Cadilhac et al.,
2011). Standard CP-nets capture complete infor-
mation: they are a compact representation of a
preference order over all the possible outcomes
of actions that agents can perform. To represent
partial preferences, we build a partial description
of a CP-net (Cadilhac et al., 2011), which ap-
proximates preferences as revealed by dialogue
moves. This avoids having to postulate a range
of player types, each associated with complete
preferences. Instead, agents will reason with and
revise partial descriptions of preferences as they
observe new evidence through dialogue moves.
A CP-net for an individual agent has two com-
ponents: a directed conditional preference graph
(CPG), which defines for each feature F its set
2K captures all a’s current commitments, including on-
going commitments from prior turns. So there is no need to










fish: white A red
meat: red A white
Preferences for B:
fish ∼B meat
fish: white B red
meat: red B white
The CPTs
Figure 1: A CP-net for the food and drink game.
of parent features Pa(F ) that affect the agent’s
preferences among the various values of F ; and a
conditional preference table (CPT), which spec-
ifies the agent’s preferences over F ’s values for
every combination of values in Pa(F ) (thus CP-
nets have a similar structure to Bayesian belief
networks (Pearl, 1988)). The CP-net for a game
consists of a CP-net for each player. For exam-
ple, the CP-net in Figure 1 represents a game
where A chooses what A and B will eat, and B
chooses what they will drink (they must eat and
drink the same thing). Agent A’s preferred Food
is fish, but the Wine he prefers is dependent on
the food: white wine for fish and red for meat.
Agent B is indifferent about what he eats, but
like A his choice of Wine is dependent on what
he eats. The logic of CP-nets follows two ranked
principles when generating the preference order
over every outcome from this compact represen-
tation: first, one prefers values that violate as few
conditional preferences as possible; and second,
violating a (conditional) preference on a parent
feature is worse than violating the preference on
a daughter feature. So Figure 1 yields the fol-
lowing partial order over all outcomes for each
agent:
(5)
(fish,white) A (fish, red) A
(meat, red) A (meat,white)
{(fish,white), (meat, red)} B
{(fish, red), (meat,white)}
There are efficient algorithms for identifying the
(unique) optimal strategy in this case (e.g., Bon-
zon (2007)): i.e., to eat fish and drink white wine.
Dialogue interpretation yields commitments to






r-wood : g-wheat C g-sheep
Figure 2: Cat’s commitments to preferences in dia-
logue (2). Receive and Give’s values are r-x and g-x
where x is wheat, clay, sheep, rock or ore.
uttering (2c) Cat commits to the partial CP-net
in Figure 2: In words, Cat would rather receive
wood than not, and given her preference for re-
ceiving wood she would rather give wheat than
sheep. This is computed recursively from the dis-
course structure of Cat’s commitment (Cadilhac
et al., 2011), although we don’t detail the map-
ping here.3
Crucially, the CP-net description in Figure 2
is partial: it doesn’t reveal Cat’s preferences for
giving wheat or sheep in a context where she
doesn’t get wood—(2c) says nothing about that.
Cat’s actual preferences may also differ from
these commitments (e.g., because of insincerity).
So to choose an optimal action, agents face a
complex calculation in (defeasibly) estimating an
agent’s complete actual preferences from com-
mitments to them.
Accordingly, we treat the preference state-
ments in the CP-net descriptions as formulas
within a background theory that provides defea-
sible inferences about preferences and behaviour.
Our background theory is CL; so CL must be able
to express and reason about descriptions of CP-
nets. Specifically, we complete the partial in-
formation in a CP-net description by adding as-
sumed preferences that defeasibly follow from it
via the default axioms in CL, with agents default-
ing to being indifferent among values for features
for which preference information is missing en-
3We take William’s and Cat’s commitments in (2) to be
as follows (Lascarides and Asher, 2009). William’s turn
commits him to Plan-Elab(a, b), which means that he com-
mits to the contents of both (2a) and (2b) and to (2b) elab-
orating a plan to achieve the goal underlying (2a) (that goal
is to obtain a sheep or wheat, and the plan afforded by (2b)
is to get one of these by trading wood). Cat’s utterance (2c)
commits her to Plan-Elab(pi, c), where pi is William’s first
turn (with content Plan-Elab(a, b)). Cadilhac et al’s (2011)
recursive algorithm yields Figure 2 from Plan-Elab(pi, c).
tirely. In logical terms this means we will have
formulae in CL of the form: χ > (φ:ψ a ¬ψ),
where χ is a well-formed formula of CL.4 In
other words, if χ is true then normally the de-
scription of a’s preferences includes φ:ψ a ¬ψ
(note that the antecedent χ may express infor-
mation about preferences too). We’ll give some
examples of such formulae in the next section.
Further, CL’s nonmonotonic inferences about an
agent’s preferences may change if the range of
actions that are considered to be a part of the
game changes (though we forego specific exam-
ples here). Overall, through the (nonmonotonic)
logic of CL’s >, one can support decisions about
what action to perform even if knowledge of pref-
erences is partial.
CL can now link preferences to other proposi-
tional attitudes. Indeed, choosing optimal actions
requires a link between preference and belief:
since a (joint) CP-net G can include variables
whose values one doesn’t control, one needs to
check that one’s optimal state(s) are not doxas-
tically improbable (this is a crude way of ensur-
ing that agents act so as to maximise expected
utility rather than acting with wishful thinking
about what’s feasible). We supply a notion of
doxastic improbability in CL via its nonmono-
tonic consequence relation: i.e., a state is belief
compliant if its negation does not defeasible fol-
low from the premises and background theory of
CL axioms. So to identify an agent’s optimal
belief-compliant state(s), we filter out any opti-
mal state that is defeasibly inconsistent with his
beliefs (as we mentioned in Section 3, this is de-
cidable). Within CL this leads to the definition
of a CP-solutiona(φ,G) for agent a and (joint)
CP-net G:
Definition 1 CP-solutiona(φ,G) holds iff:
1. a is a player in the joint CP-net G; and
2. s ` φ for every belief-compliant optimal
state s of G. I.e., where Γ is the premises—
in other words, CL’s background theory plus
information about the mental states of the
players in G—we have Γ 6|∼Ba¬s, and for
4Since the features in our CP-nets all take finite values,
they can be represented in CL using Boolean variables.
any state s′ that is strictly more optimal in
G than s, Γ|∼Ba¬s′ holds.
For example, if B’s model of A’s and his own
preferences are those in Figure 1, then by Defini-
tion 1 CP-solutionB(fish∧white, G) holds: while
meat∧ red is equally preferred by B, it is not be-
lief compliant because G defeasibily entails that
A will choose white and not red. We’ll see this
in the next section, when we use CP-solutions to
define CL axioms that approximate principles of
rational action from game theory.
3.2 Axioms of Rationality
To encode means-end reasoning of rational
agents in our symbolic model, we need CL ax-
ioms that make agents pay-off maximisers (cf. ra-
tionality from game theory) and basic coopera-
tive. Pay-off maximisers intend actions that are
an optimal trade-off between their preferences
and their beliefs about what’s possible; and an
agent intending ψ means in the context of his cur-
rent beliefs he prefers ψ to all alternative actions.
We capture these two principles with the axioms
Maximising Utility (a) and (b):
Maximising Utility:
a. (G ∧ CP-solutiona(ψ,G)) > Iaψ
b. (Iaψ∧player(i, G)) > CP-solutiona(ψ,G)
Maximising Utility part (a) ensures a intends
ψ only if ψ follows from all belief-compliant
optimal states (by Definition 1). Indeed, agent
a’s intentions are conditional on all of a’s be-
liefs (thanks to Definition 1) and all of a’s pref-
erences and those of any player that affect a’s
preferences. The latter property follows because
the weak conditional > validates the Penguin
Principle—i.e., default consequences of rules
with more specific antecedents override conflict-
ing defaults from less specific antecedents. So if
a more specific game G′ is known to hold and
it yields conflicting intentions to those resulting
from G, then the intentions from G′ are inferred
and those from G aren’t. Axiom (b) likewise
conditions a’s preference for ψ on all his be-
liefs (thanks to Definition 1). It yields (default)
constraints on G from intentions: if one knows
Iaψ and nothing about G or about a’s beliefs,
then the minimal CP-net G that satisfies the de-
fault consequence is simply the global preference
ψ a ¬ψ. As agents converse, each dialogue
action may reveal new information about inten-
tions, and via Maximising Utility part (b) this
imposes new constraints on G. But while Max-
imise Utility part (b) is conservative about ex-
actly which of a’s beliefs his preference for ψ
is conditioned on, his dialogue moves can reveal
more precise information—e.g., the utterance I
want to go to the mall to eat should be sufficient
to infer eat : mall i ¬mall. A detailed algo-
rithm for extracting preferences and dependen-
cies among them from conversation is detailed
in Cadilhac et al. (2011), but the details of this
aren’t relevant for our purposes here.
Basic cooperativity follows from an axiom that
makes all agents intend that their commitments
be shared among all the other dialogue agents:
Intent to Share Commitment:
(b ∈ D ∧ Pa,Dφ ∧ ¬Pb,Dφ) > Pa,DIaPb,Dφ
If a commits, when addressing b (among oth-
ers), to content φ and b hasn’t committed to this
yet, then normally a is also committed to intend-
ing that b so commit. This rule captures basic co-
operativity because b committing to a’s commit-
ments entails he understands a’s commitments
(Clark, 1996). Indeed, it captures something
much stronger than basic cooperativity—an in-
tention that your contribution be accepted by oth-
ers. While this is stronger than basic cooperativ-
ity, we think it’s rational even in non-cooperative
dialogue contexts: why commit to content if you
don’t intend that others accept the commitment?
In addition, we regiment a constraint on asser-
tions proposed by (Perrault, 1990, p180), by re-
fining this axiom for assertions: when a’s address
to b commits him to an assertion K, then nor-
mally Pa,DIaBbK.
Now let’s examine more carefully the special
case of Gricean cooperativity. We start by defin-
ing a Grice Cooperative game:
Definition 2 A game is Grice Cooperative
(GC) just in case for any of its players a and b
1. their speech acts normally have their con-
ventional purpose (e.g., they normally ask a
question so as to know a true answer); and
2. (φ : ψ a ¬ψ) > (φ : ψ b ¬ψ)
(i.e., the agents’ preferences normally
align).
We can now prove all the axioms in Fact 1.
Fact 1 Sincerity: (Pa,Dφ ∧GC) > Baφ
Sincerity for Intentions:
(Pa,DIaφ ∧GC) > Iaφ
Sincerity for Preferences:
(Pa,D(φ : ψ a ¬ψ) ∧GC) > φ : ψ a ¬ψ
Competence:
(Pa,Dφ ∧ Pb,D?φ ∧ a, b ∈ D)→
((BbBaφ ∧GC) > Bbφ)
Cooperativity:
(b ∈ D ∧ Pa,DIaφ ∧GC) > Ibφ
These axioms make any declared belief, inten-
tion or preference in a GC conversation nor-
mally an actual belief, intention or preference
too (cf. the Gricean maxim of Quality (Grice,
1975, p45)). Competence makes belief transfer
the norm (if b asked whether φ). This default
likewise follows from Grice’s Maxim of Quality
as he described it in (Grice, 1989, p371): he stip-
ulates that in order to contribute to a conversation
via the Maxim of Quality, one must say what is
true. To do otherwise is not to contribute inferior
information; rather, it contributes no information
at all. Furthermore, Lewis (1969) argues persua-
sively that unless such a principle of competence
forms the basis of cognitive modelling, then one
cannot construct a sound philosophical argument
that explains why linguistic conventions come
into being in the first place, or why we assume
that a speaker whom we understand is speaking
the same language as we are—a hallmark of ba-
sic cooperativity. Finally, Cooperativity makes a
declared individual intention normally a shared
actual intention (recall the Gricean notion of ut-
terance meaning in conversation (Grice, 1969,
p151) and the corresponding notion of Strong
Cooperativity from Section 1). Such principles
of sincerity and cooperativity are usually taken as
primitive axioms in BDI approaches to dialogue;
here, we derive them when agents D are players
in a joint game G that satisfies Definition 2.
Outline Proofs: Sincerity: Suppose Pa,Dφ
and GC hold and moreover that φ expresses
a proposition that is capable of being believed.
Then we’ll show that if all the normal GC con-
sequences hold (see Definition 2), then Baφ must
also hold.
By Intent to Share Commitment, Pa,DIaBbφ
defeasibly follows from our premises for any
b ∈ D. By Maximising Utility and the fact
that I is a D modality, IaBbφ defeasibly implies
Bbφ a ¬Bbφ. Upon learning of a’s commit-
ment and the fact that the game is GC (in par-
ticular, clause 1 of Definition 2 means that the
preference underlying a’s move φ that we have
just derived is a’s actual preference), we infer
Bbφ b ¬Bbφ. Assume further that belief prefer-
ences pattern after factual preferences. That is:
(Bbφ b ¬Bφ)→ (φ b ¬φ)
(¬Bbφ b Bφ)→ ¬(φ b ¬φ)
So φ b ¬φ. Now suppose that ¬Baφ. Then
assuming we prefer our belief actions when we
have them, ¬Baφ a Baφ, and therefore ¬(φ a
¬φ). Thus the game cannot be a normal GC
game, contrary to our assumptions. So Baφ.
Now, Weak Deduction is a valid rule of the
weak conditional > (Asher, 1995): if Γ, φ|∼ψ,
Γ|∼/ψ and Γ|∼/¬(φ > ψ) then Γ|∼(φ > ψ). So
Weak Deduction yields the desired > statement,
(Pa,Dφ ∧ GC) > Baφ. 2. We can also derive
(though we don’t show it here) a stronger version
of Sincerity where a doesn’t believe alternatives
to what he said, yielding scalar implicatures.
Sincerity for Intentions: Suppose Pa,DIaφ∧
GC. By Sincerity (which we’ve just proved),
BaIaφ. Since intentions are doxastically trans-
parent (i.e. BaIaφ ↔ Iaφ), the result follows
with an application of Weak Deduction. 2.
Sincerity for Preferences is proved in a sim-
ilar way, using also the assumption that prefer-
ences are doxastically transparent. 2.
Competence: Suppose Pb,D?φ∧Pa,Dφ∧ b ∈
D ∧ BbBaφ and a GC game. Given Defini-
tion 2, the intention that normally underlies ask-
ing a question (i.e., to know an answer) and Max-
imising Utility ensures that b’s asking φ implies
Bbφ ∨ Bb¬φ b ¬(Bbφ ∨ Bb¬φ). So by GC
(i.e., the agents’ preferences normally align), we
also have: Bbφ∨Bb¬φ a ¬(Bbφ∨Bb¬φ). By
Maximising Utility we can assume that b’s ask-
ing a question together with a’s response are both
optimal moves in equilibrium. These moves then
should realise the preference Bbφ ∨ Bb¬φ b
¬(Bbφ∨Bb¬φ). Furthermore, by Sincerity, Baφ.
There are two choices now: either a is trustwor-
thy or not. If a is not trustworthy, then his com-
mitment to φ is no indication of its truth. But
then there is a move (do not ask a whether φ)
that would have been more advantageous for b
(given that listening to someone and processing
the response is a cost). So given that Pb,D?φ is
the equilibrium move—in other words, this is a
move that is optimal for b in that it maximises
his expected utility—b must believe a to be trust-
worthy, and so Bbφ. Using Weak Deduction thus
yields Competence. 2.
Cooperativity: Assume b ∈ D ∧ Pa,DIaφ ∧
GC. By Sincerity for Intentions, we have
Iaφ. By Maximising Utility, we can in-
fer CP-solutiona(φ,G), where G is the GC
game with at least a and b as players. By
GC and Competence, this defeasibly entails
CP-solutionb(φ,G). And so Maximising Utility
yields Ibφ. Using Weak Deduction gets us the
desired > statement. 2.
Intention and belief transfer in a GC conver-
sation is a default: even if preferences align,
conflicting beliefs may mean agents have dif-
ferent CP-solutions making their intentions dif-
ferent too (by Maximising Utility), and Compe-
tence may apply but its consequent isn’t inferred.
Thus rejection and denial occur in GC dialogues
(see (3)). On the other hand, in GC environ-
ments interpretations are normally credible: e.g.,
by Sincerity and Competence B’s assertion (3b)
yields belief transfer that there’s no parking. This
is a simple, symbolic counterpart to the much
more elaborate result concerning credibility from
Crawford and Sobel (1982).
4 Related Work
In contrast to Gricean formalisations in BDI log-
ics, we have conditioned Gricean behaviour on
shared preferences rather than shared intentions
(see Definition 2) and we have derived Gricean
axioms from a more general axiomatisation of
human behaviour rather than treating them as
primitive.
Signalling games provide a basis for predicting
conversational implicatures (e.g., Parikh (2001),
van Rooij (2004)) and also insincerity—the less
aligned the preferences, the less credible the sig-
nals (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). But signalling
models either take a signal to mean whatever it
is optimal for it to mean (thereby bypassing lin-
guistic convention) or the mapping [.] from sig-
nals to meaning is fixed and monotonic (e.g., Far-
rell (1993), Franke (2010)), with pragmatic in-
terpretations being entirely epistemic in nature:
they arise when the optimal interpretation of s is
distinct from [s]. Our model differs in its view
of conventional meaning: while we acknowl-
edge that some pragmatic inferences are epis-
temic (e.g., see Sincerity), we also believe that
[s] goes beyond lexical and compositional se-
mantics because it is constrained to be coherent
(Lascarides and Asher, 2009). But this makes
computing [s] defeasible, which reflects the fact
that all inferences about coherence are defeasible.
So in non-cooperative conversation, an interlocu-
tor must test rigorously his defeasible inference
about what the speaker is publicly committed to,
as well as test the credibility of that commitment
(i.e., whether the speaker believes it). We hope
that CL can model such tests, but leave this to fu-
ture work.
5 Conclusions
We have proposed a qualitative model of cogni-
tive reasoning with several desirable features for
modelling dialogue: it supports reasoning with
partial information about preferences; and it dis-
tinguishes the public commitments one makes
through utterances and private mental states that
affect and are affected by them. The axioms of
the cognitive logic approximate rational action
from game theory and compel agents to be ba-
sic cooperative. We showed that Gricean prin-
ciples of sincerity and cooperativity are deriv-
able from them when the agents’ preferences nor-
mally align.
We have focused here entirely on the cogni-
tive model; linking it to dialogue content is ongo-
ing work. The cognitive logic should also be dy-
namic since dialogue actions trigger changes to
mental states: our static CL can be made dynamic
with no cost to complexity by exploiting pub-
lic announcement logic (Asher and Lascarides,
2011). Finally, progress in analysing strategic
conversation requires an extensive study of data
in many domains: e.g., political debate, com-
mercial negotiations, courtroom cross examina-
tion and others. The Settlers dialogues cited here
are all taken from our ongoing corpus collection
effort, in which utterances are aligned with ma-
chine readable game states. We hope to release
this corpus, labelled with rich semantic and cog-
nitive information, in due course.
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